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Case No. 20150832-CA
INTHE

UT AH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

CHANCE ARIC NAVARRO,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from convictions on two counts of possession of a
dangerous weapon by a resh·icted person, third degree felonies, and
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. This Court has
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2015).

INTRODUCTION
Officers stopped Defendant's car because its windows appeared to be
illegally tinted and because they believed that Defendant was a felon
illegally possessing a weapon. Defendant concedes that the stop was lawful
based on the windows tint. But Defendant contends that the officers did not
0

diligently pursue" a course of action that was likely to dispel or confirm

the purposes of the stop. He alleges that the officers delayed processing the
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stop to have a drug dog sniff the car and claims that the h·ial court erred in
denying his motion to suppress evidence they found.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Did the officers' stop and subsequent search of Defendant's car
violate his Fourth Amendment rights?

Standard of Review. A trial court's decision on a motion to suppress
evidence for an alleged Fourth Amendment violation is a mixed question of
law and fact. State v. Fuller, 2014 UT 29, if 17, 332 P.3d 937. The court's
underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error. Id. The court's
legal conclusions are reviewed non-deferentially for correctness, including
its application of the legal standard to the facts. Id.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provision and statute are reproduced in
the Addendum:
U.S. Const. amend. IV;
Utah Code Ann. §41-62-1635 (West Supp. 2013).

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
A.

Summary of Facts.

On the night of August 1, 2013, members of the Washington County
drug task force were surveilling a tire store located in an industrial park in

-2-
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St. George. R141, 1.71. They were looking for Travis Farnsworth for whom
they had obtained an arrest warrant. R141. The task force did not find
Farnsworth that night but witnessed illegal drug activity. R171-76.
While the task force was looking for Farnsworth, a woman showed
up at the business driving a van registered to Daniel Cooney, who was
working in the store. R145-46. Detective Jason Jarvey saw Defendant arrive
at the store in a green Tahoe SUV. R139, 146; see also R208.
At about 10:55 p.m., Sergeant Jared Parry saw Cooney inside the
store, putting a white pipe to his mouth, smoking, and exhaling whitecolored smoke. R150. Based on his experience, Parry believed that Cooney
was smoking illegal drugs. RlSl.
Parry then saw Defendant walk out of the tire store, place a backpack
in the passenger side of the Tahoe, and return to the store. R146, 151-52. At
that point, Parry was able to identify him. Id. Parry knew Defendant from a
criminal case several years earlier- he knew that Defendant had pleaded

guilty to some felony charges in exchange for the State's dropping charges
against his wife. R157. The case involved "a decent amount of marijuana as
well as a handgun."

R158.

Based on the case, Parry believed that

Defendant was prohibited from possessing a firearm as a convicted felon.
Id. Parry also knew that two known confidential informants had reported

-3-
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that Defendant "had guns, and that if he was stopped by police he was
going to shoot it out with the police." R159. 1
While watching Defendant, Sergeant Parry noticed that the tint on the
Tahoe's windows was extremely dark. R152. Based on his experience, he
was "very confident" that the tint was too dark to be legal. R154. Parry also
observed Defendant scanning the area around the store with binoculars.
R155-56.

At some point, Defendant went back outside and opened the

Tahoe's hatchback. R156. When he did so, Parry saw an object that, based
on its shape, appeared to be a rifle case. R157.
At 11:39 p.m., Defendant drove away in his green Tahoe. R161-62.
Four other vehicles followed, creating "a little convoy." Id. Parry believed
at this point that there was reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant: the
window tint was too dark and it appeared that Defendant was a felon
illegally possessing a gun. R179-80.

Parry advised the other task force

members via radio of the tint violation and urged officers to use caution
with Defendant because he had a gun case in his car and could be
dangerous. R163, 209, 238-39.

1

This information had come to Parry through other investigators, but
he personally knew and could contact the informants who had made the
allegation. R160.
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Task force members Jim Jessop and Nick Nuccitelli 2 watched the
convoy travel to a Wendy's, where one car drove through the drive-up
service lane before rejoining the others.

R212.

They then watched

Defendant's car and a black car move on to a nearby Denny's parking lot.
R213. Officer Jessop confirmed that Defendant's windows "appeared to be
way too dark," that they were "[n]ot even borderline." R213, 214. Officers
Jessop and Nuccitelli turned into the Denny's lot and, at approximately
11:45 p.m., activated their overhead lights to stop both vehicles. R164, 21415.

A woman exited the black passenger car and walked quickly towards
Denny's, but the officers ordered her to the ground. R215. After the woman
complied, the officers turned their attention to Defendant's car- one officer
approached the driver's side and the other officer approached the
passenger's side. R216. The officers ordered Defendant to show them his
hands. Id.

He was slow to comply, but eventually showed them both

hands. R217. Officers Jessop and Nuccitelli then opened the Tahoe's door,
got Defendant out, and frisked him. R218. When they discovered a knife
with a four-to-five-inch fixed blade near Defendant's front belt pocket, the
2

The motion-to-suppress transcript spells the name as Nutchatelli.
See R238. But the officer signed the probable cause statement with
Nuccitelli. See R4. The State therefore uses that spelling.

-5-
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officers handcuffed him and began talking to him about the tint violation.
R218-20.
Sergeant Parry arrived at the Denny's lot while Detective Jessop was
talking with Defendant, and he too talked with Defendant about the tint
violation. R165. None of the officers had a tint meter, so they requested
one. R166. And at 12:03 a.m., Sergeant Parry called for a drug dog, which
was "within blocks" of the Denny's.

R168-69.

Another officer ran

Defendant's criminal history on his computer and learned that Defendant
was not a felon. R201-02. 3 Shortly after, the canine officer arrived at the
scene and deployed his drug dog. R169, 233, 255. The dog alerted on the
car. R170-71. Sometime after that, another officer arrived with the tint
meter. R233, 255.
At 12:12 a.m., officers searched Defendant's car. R170-71. They found
an AK-47 and a Tek-9 with ammunition in reach of the driver. R3. Inside
the center console, they found a pipe with white residue along with a baggie
of suspected methamphetamine. Id. Defendant later admitted to having

3

Sergeant Parry later discovered why Defendant was not a felon: at
some point, a reduction had been entered in Defendant's felony case. R202.
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smoked methamphetamine earlier 1n the day and also to owning the
firearms inside the Tahoe. 4 R4.

B. Summary of Proceedings.
Defendant was charged with two counts of illegally possessing a
dangerous weapon, third degree felonies; possessing methamphetamine, a
third degree felony; possessing drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor;
and operating a vehicle with illegally tinted windows, a class C
misdemeanor. Rl-2.

After bindover, Defendant moved to suppress the

evidence found in the search. R19.

The h·ial court held an evidentiary

hearing and took argument on the motion.

R28; R137-279.

In its oral

findings, the trial court found that "a tint n1eter was requested," that "it
arrived probably in the neighborhood of 20 minutes after the stop," and that
"the drug dog arrived in the neighborhood of probably 10 or 15 minutes
after the stop" and "prior to the time the tint meter got there." R258. The
court relied on the testimony of two officers that the meter "clearly arrived
after the drug dog arrived there and after the sniff had been done." R260.
There was "[n]o evidence to the contrary." Id. In its written findings, the
trial court further found that "both a tint meter and a K-9 unit were

4

Because Defendant has not included a copy of the trial transcript on
appeal, the State cites here to the probable cause statement.

-7-
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requested shortly after the stop, and that the tint meter did not arrive until
after the arrival of the K-9 unit." R59.
Based on these findings, the court ruled that "[o]nce the K-9 alerted
on the defendant's vehicle, the detectives had reasonable suspicion of
additional serious criminal activity, and could appropriately expand the
investigative scope of the initial stop." Id. The court denied the motion to
suppress, concluding that II the detectives did not act unconstitutionally in
the initial detention of defendant for an equipment violation, nor did they
act unconstitutionally in the expanded investigation of defendant for
additional serious criminal activity." R60
Defendant was tried and convicted of two counts of possession of a
dangerous weapon by a restricted person (unlawful user of a controlled
substance) and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. R129. The
trial court sentenced Defendant to two prison terms of up to five years on
the weapons counts and to a six-month jail term on the paraphernalia count.
R129. The court ordered that the terms be served concurrently. Id. The

Court stayed execution of the sentence and placed Defendant on probation
for 36 months. R130. Defendant tiinely appealed. R133.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The officers' stop did not violate Defendant's Fourth Amendment
rights. Defendant concedes that the stop was lawful at its inception based
on reasonable suspicion that his windows were illegally tinted. But the stop
was also lawful at its inception based on an officer's observation of the rifleshaped case in Defendant's car and his knowledge that Defendant had been
convicted of a felony, making it illegal to possess a weapon.
The stop was also executed in a reasonable manner. The officers
"diligently pursued" the purposes of the stop. The officers conducted a
criminal history check, which dispelled their suspicion that he was a felon
in possession of a weapon. They also requested a tint meter and, upon its
arrival, confirmed their suspicion of the tint violation.

The drug dog

request, deployment, and alert was made in the interim and thus did not
extend the length of the detention. The evidence supports the trial court's
findings that the officers requested the tint meter and K-9 unit shortly after
the stop was made and that the dog arrived and alerted before the tint
meter arrived.

Defendant contends that the officers should have first

contacted dispatch about the stop and requested the driver license,
registration, and proof of insurance.

-9-
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appropriate, officers are not required to make those inquiries or make them
before investigating the suspected traffic or criminal offenses.

ARGUMENT
THE TRAFFIC STOP WAS LAWFUL AT ITS INCEPTION
AND EXECUTED IN A REASONABLE MANNER

A traffic or investigatory stop must meet two basic Fourth
Amendment require1nents. First, the stop must be "lawful at its inception,"
and second, the stop must be "executed in a reasonable manner.'' Illinois v.

Caballes, 543 U.S. 405,408 (2005).
The stop here was "lawful at its inception." After officers saw the
illegally-dark window tint on Defendant's Tahoe, they had reasonable
suspicion to stop him for an equipment violation. In addition, one of the
officers knew Defendant, who had pleaded guilty in a felony case a few
years earlier. When the officer saw Defendant lift the hatch of the car to
expose what appeared to be a rifle case, he had reasonable suspicion to stop
Defendant for illegally possessing a weapon. Thus, as the trial court ruled,
the stop was justified at its inception.
Moreover, as the trial court also ruled, the officers diligently pursued
the purposes of the stop.

They ran a criminal history check to verify

Defendant's status as a felon and requested a tint meter to determine
whether Defendant's windshield complied with the tint laws. Thus, the stop
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was executed in a reasonable manner. The drug dog request, deployment,
and alert were made in the interim and did not extend the length of the
stop.
A. The stop was justified at its inception.

A traffic or investigatory stop "for a suspected violation of the law is
a 'seizure' of the occupants of the vehicle and therefore must be conducted
in accordance with the Fourth Amendment." Heien v. North Carolina, 135
S.Ct. 530, 536 (2014) (citing Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 255-59 (2007)).
To justify this type of seizure, "officers need only 'reasonable suspicion' that is, 'a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular
person stopped' of breaking the law." Id. (quoting Navarette v. California,
134 S.Ct. 1683, 1687-88 (2014) (additional internal quotation omitted)).
This is true whether or not the officers are motivated by some other
purposes in making the stop. In Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996),
the Supreme Court held that the temporary detention of a motorist upon
probable cause to believe that he has violated the traffic laws does not
violate the Fourth Amendment, even if a reasonable officer would not have
stopped the motorist absent some additional objective. In so holding, the
Court reasoned that its case law "foreclose[s] any argument that the
constitutional reasonableness of h·affic stops depends on the actual

-11-
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motivations of the individual officers involved."

Id. 813.

"Subjective

intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment
analysis." Id.
The Utah Supreme Court has also held that if "reasonable in scope, a
traffic stop based on probable cause or reasonable suspicion that the driver
has violated any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment
regulations, is lawful under the Fourth Amendment." State v. Lopez, 873
P.2d 1127, 1140 (Utah 1994), (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661
(1979) (internal quotation omitted)). It is "irrelevant what else the officer
knew or suspected about the h·affic violator at the tin1e of the stop." Id.
1. As Defendant concedes, the stop was justified at its
inception based on the officers' observations of the illegal
window tint.

Defendant concedes that the stop was justified at its inception based
on the officers' observation of the window tint. See Br.Aplt. 12-13; State v.

Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994) (holding that an observed traffic
violation justifies stop). He further concedes that the officers' subjective
motives for initiating the stop are irrelevant. Br.Aplt. 12-13.

-12-
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2. The stop was also justified at its inception based on an
officer's observation of a gun case in Defendant's car and
the officer's knowledge that Defendant had pleaded
guilty to a felony.

Moreover, and contrary to Defendant's claim otherwise, Br.Aplt. 22,
the facts known to Officer Parry also supported reasonable suspicion that
Defendant was a felon in possession of a firearm and therefore in violation
of the law. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(1)(b)(i) & (3)(a) (West 2015)
(making it a third degree felony for a felon to possess a firearm). That night,
Officer Parry had seen what appeared, based on its shape, to be a rifle case
in Defendant's car. R157. Parry had been directly involved in a criminal
case a few years earlier where Defendant pleaded guilty to felony charges.

Id. These matters supported a reasonable suspicion that Defendant was a
felon and therefore illegally possessing a dangerous weapon.
B.

The ensuing detention was executed in a reasonable manner.

To comport with the Fourth Amendment, a stop justified at its
inception must also be executed in a reasonable manner. Cabelles, 543 U.S.
at 408. A stop is reasonable in its execution so long as the officer "diligently
pursue[s]" a course of action that is likely to fulfill the purpose of the stop.

See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985). The police must end the
stop and release the vehicle's occupants "when [they] have no further need
to control the scene." Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009).

-13-
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This

normally occurs once the initial purpose of the stop is concluded. State v.

Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ,I31, 63 P.3d 650.

But officers are allowed ' to
0

graduate their responses to the demands of [the] particular situation."'

Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686 (citation omitted). Accordingly, if during the scope of
a stop, an "officer forms new reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal
activity, the officer may also expediently investigate his new suspicion."

State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18, if 13, 229 P.3d 650.
Defendant contends that the ensuing detention was not executed in a
reasonable manner. See Br.Aplt. 14-21.

He is wrong.

The officers here

"diligently pursued" a course of action that was likely to fulfill the purposes
of the stop-first, to determine whether the Tahoe had illegally tinted
windows and, second, to determine whether Defendant had violated the
law prohibiting felons from possessing weapons.
Defendant contends that the officers impermissibly exploited the
traffic stop because the officers did not advise the dispatcher that they had
initiated the stop and because they did not ask Defendant to produce his
driver license, vehicle registration, or proof of insurance. Br.Aplt. 16. He
argues that the stop did not "resemble a h·affic stop"; that the officers
unreasonably waited 18 minutes to request a tint meter and did not request
the tint meter before they called for the K-9 unit; and that the officers

-14-
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unreasonably spent time runnmg Defendant's criminal history in an
attempt to detennine if he was a convicted felon. Id. 19. Defendant cannot
prevail on any of these claims.
1. The officers executed the stop in a reasonable manner:
not contacting dispatch and not asking Defendant to
produce his driver license, vehicle registration, or proof of
insurance did not expand the scope of the stop.

Defendant first claims that the officers impermissibly exploited the
stop because they did not contact dispatch to alert dispatch that they had
stopped Defendant and because they did not ask Defendant to produce his
driver license, vehicle registration, or proof of insurance. Id. 16. Defendant
has set forth no law requiring officers to take those measures. He has set
forth no law suggesting that absent such measures, the execution of the stop
is unreasonable.

Defendant simply claims, again without citing legal

authority, that "if police are going to be able to conduct pretext stops," their
encounters "must, on some level, resemble ... h·affic stop[s]." Id. 17.
But, as explained, under controlling precedent, a stop is reasonable in
its execution so long as the officer "diligently pursue[s]" a course of action
that is likely to fulfill the purpose of the stop. See United States v. Sharpe, 470
U.S. 675, 686 (1985).

Here, officers stopped Defendant because they

believed his windows were tinted too darkly and because they believed he
was a felon in possession of a dangerous weapon. In the course of such a

-15-
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stop, officers certainly "'may request a driver's license and vehicle
registration.'" State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, if 31, 63 P.3d 650 (quoting Lopez,
873 P.2d at 1132). But they are not required to do so. Nor are they required
to conduct their investigation in any particular order. See State v. Baker, 2010
UT 18, ~17, 229 P.3d 650 (holding that courts "should not micromanage the
details of a traffic stop").

Immediately calling dispatch or requesting

Defendant's driver license, vehicle registration, or insurance information
would not confirm or dispel the officers' suspicions about the tint violation
or Defendant's status as a felon. To detennine whether the Tahoe had a tint
violation, the officers needed to get an objective measure of the window's
transparency.

And to determine whether Defendant was a felon, they

needed to get his criminal history. Thus, seeking a tint meter and checking
Defendant's criminal history did not unlawfully exploit the stop. Rather,
these actions were directly related to the purpose of the stop.
2. The officers diligently pursued the purposes of the stop.

Sergeant Parry testified that Defendant's car and the other vehicles in
his "convoy" left the tire shop at 11:39 p.m. The convoy first traveled to
Wendy's and one car went through the drive-up lane. R212. After that car
rejoined the convoy, all of the cars left the Wendy's. Id. Defendant's car

-16Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and a black passenger car proceeded into a Denny's parking lot, where
officers stopped them. R213.
After stopping Defendant at approximately 11:45 p.m., the officers
did not merely wait for the drug dog, as Defendant suggests. They did a
number of things in furtherance of the purpose of the stop. First, Detective
Jessop and Officer Nuccitelli took the necessary safety precautions to
protect themselves. See Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015)
(holding that "tolerable duration" of a stop includes time needed to "attend
to related safety concerns"). Upon making the stop, the woman in the black
car tried to leave the scene and the officers ordered her to the ground. R215.
This was entirely appropriate.

They needed to be able to focus on

Defendant without having to worry about her. See Brendlin v. California, 551
U.S. 249, 258 (2007) (holding that it is reasonable for officers "not [to] let
people move around in ways that could jeopardize [officer] safety"). They
also knew that Defendant had threatened to shoot any officer who stopped
him and were aware of a rifle-shaped case in his car. Id.
Thus, they took reasonable measures to protect the1nselves from
Defendant. After securing the woman, the officers approached Defendant's
car, asked him to show his hands, conducted a weapons frisk, and disarmed
him.

R216-20.

These measures were necessary to enable the officers to
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pursue the purpose of the stop. They could only proceed with investigating
the tinted windows and the firearm possession after they had taken the
steps necessary to protect themselves.
Once protected, the officers directed their activity toward confirming
or dispelling their beliefs about Defendant's violations. An officer with a
computer responded to the scene and officers thereafter checked
Defendant's criminal history to see if he was a felon, found out that he was
not, and thereby dispelled their suspicion that he was a felon illegally
possessing a weapon. They also requested a tint meter-which Sergeant
Parry had begun arranging for before the stop. See R59; R240. The officers
could not confirm or dispel their suspicions about the windows until the
meter arrived. In the interim, the officers requested a drug dog and the dog
alerted on the car. See R168. That was all accomplished as they waited for
the tint meter. Because the drug dog request, deployment, and alert did not
prolong the stop, it did not violate Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.

See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408 (holding that dog sniff does "not change the
character of a traffic stop that is lawful at its inception and otherwise
executed in a reasonable manner").
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3. The evidence supports the trial court's finding that the
tint meter and K-9 unit were both requested shortly after
the stop was made.

The trial court found that "both the tint meter and a K-9 unit were
requested shortly after the stop." R59. Defendant claims that the finding is
not supported by the evidence. Br.Aplt. 18. Defendant is wrong.
In finding that the meter and K-9 unit were requested shortly after the
stop, the court relied on the officers' testimony. Officer Nuccitelli testified
that he was told before they stopped Defendant that Sergeant Parry was
arranging for the tint meter. R240. And Officer Parry testified upon hearing
that Detective Jessop and Officer Nuccitelli had stopped Defendant, he
drove the few blocks to the Denny's parking lot, where he talked with
Defendant about the tint violation. R165. Because none of the officers had a
meter, someone requested one. R166. While Parry did not reme1nber with
certainty who made the call, he testified that he likely did. R166.
The court's finding that Officer Parry requested a drug dog a short
time after the stop was 1nade is also supported by the testimony of the
officers. Sergeant Parry testified that he requested the dog at 12:03 a.m.
R168. That was about twenty minutes after the convoy left tire store, after

the convoy h·aveled to Wendy's and after one of the cars had gone through
the drive-up lane. See R212. And it was after Defendant's car and the black
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passenger car had traveled to the Denny's parking lot; the woman driving
the black car was secured; and Defendant was ordered out of the car,
frisked, disarmed, and handcuffed. R213-15. Thus, while the call for the
drug dog may have occurred briefly after the call for the tint meter, the trial
court could reasonably have found that both calls were made "shortly after"
the stop.
Based on the testimony given, the trial court knew that Sergeant Parry
was part of a group of officers working together on this matter. R168. He
was at most a few blocks away from the Denny's when Defendant was
stopped. R168. He had already begun arranging for a tint meter to arrive.
R240. It is not clear whether or not he located one before he traveled to the
site. But upon driving the few blocks to the stop scene, he talked with
Defendant about the tint violation, checked to see if anyone there had a
meter, and finding that no one did, either personally requested one or had
one of his officers do so. R165-66. Under these circumstances, the trial court
could reasonably have determined that this happened shortly after the stop
was made.
4. The K-9 unit was called and arrived on the scene before
the tint meter arrived.

Defendant claims that Sergeant Parry's testimony suggests that the
tint meter arrived at the scene before the K-9 unit was summoned. Br.Aplt.
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16. This claim arises from Defendant's misunderstanding of the testimony
given.
Sergeant Parry testified that he called for the K-9 unit at 12:03 a.m.
R168. He also testified that the Detective Schuman arrived with the dog
shortly after Parry called and sometime before 12:12 a.m. R169. The drug
dog alerted on Defendant's car, and the officers began searchmg the car at
12:12 a.m. R170-71.
Detective Jessop testified that the meter arrived after the dog. R233.
Officer Nuccitelli testified that the drug dog arrived in less than 15 minutes
from the time Defendant was stopped. R233. He testified that the meter
arrived about 20 minutes after the stop. R235. Putting this together, the
court found, based on the testimony of Jessop and Nuccitelli, that the meter
clearly arrived after the dog arrived. R124.
All this supports a finding that the dog arrived and sniffed
Defendant's car sometime after 12:03 a.m., and the meter arrived somewhat
later.
Defendant argues to the contrary, that Sergeant Parry testified that
the tint meter arrived "[s]ometime before midnight twelve." Br.Aplt. 16
(citing Parry's testimony at R137:69 [R205]). He claims that in so testifying,
Parry testified that the tint meter arrived sometime before midnight and
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thus at least three minutes before officers called for the K-9. But, as his
other testimony shows, when Parry testified that the meter arrived
sometime before ''midnight twelve," he did not mean that it arrived
sometime before midnight. Rather he meant that it arrived sometime before
12:12 a.m.

Thus, Defendant's claim that Parry suggested that the tint meter
arrived on the scene three minutes or more before the dog sniff is simply a
misreading. "Midnight twelve" does not mean "midnight.''

CONCLUSION
In sum, the record supports the trial court's findings about what
happened that night. The record does not show that the officers failed to
diligently pursue the purposes of the stop or that the dog arrived and
sniffed the drugs after the purposes of the stop had been completed. For the
foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the trial court's denial of the
motion to suppress.

-22Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Respectfully submitted on July 5, 2016.
SEAN D. REYES

Utah Attorney General
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A ddendum

U.S. CONST. amend. IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
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§ 41-Ga-1635. Windshields and ... , U.C.A. 1953 § ... (Supp. 2013)

IWest's Utah Code Annotated
!Title 41. Motor Vehicles
IChapter 6A. Traffic Code (Refs & Annos)
IPart 16. Vehicle Equipment
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-6a-1635
§ 41-6a-1635. Windshields and windows--Tinting--Obstructions reducing visibility--Wipers--Prohibitions
Currentness

(1) Except as provided in Subsections (2) and (3), a person may not operate a motor vehicle with:

(a) a windshield that allows less than 70% light transmittance;

(b) a front side window that allows less than 43% light transmittance;

(c) any windshield or window that is composed of, covered by, or treated with any material or component that presents a
metallic or mirrored appearance; or

(d) any sign, poster, or other nontransparent material on the windshield or side windows of the motor vehicle except:

(i) a certificate or other paper required to be so displayed by law; or

(ii) the vehicle's identification number displayed or etched in accordance with rules made by the department under
Section 4 l -6a-l601.

(2) Nontransparent materials may be used:

(a) along the top edge of the windshield if the materials do not extend downward more than four inches from the top edge
of the windshield or beyond the AS- I line whichever is lowest;

',':!ESTlt'i\\'
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§ 41-Ga-1635. Windshields and ... , U.C.A. 1953 § ... (Supp. 2013)

(b) in the lower left-hand corner of the windshield provided they do not extend more than three inches to the right of the
left edge or more than four inches above the bottom edge of the windshield; or

(c) on the rear windows including rear side windows located behind the vehicle operator.

(3) A windshield or other window is considered to comply with the requirements of Subsection (1) if the windshield or other
window meets the federal statutes and regulations for motor vehicle window composition, covering, light transmittance, and
treatment.

(4) Except for material used on the windshield in compliance with Subsections (2)(a) and (b), a motor vehicle with tinting or
nontransparent material on any window shall be equipped with rear-view mirrors mounted on the left side and on the right
side of the motor vehicle to reflect to the driver a view of the highway to the rear of the motor vehicle.

(5)(a)(i) The windshield on a motor vehicle shall be equipped with a device for cleaning rain, snow, or other moisture from
the windshield.

(ii) The device shall be constructed to be operated by the operator of the motor vehicle.

(b) A windshield wiper on a motor vehicle shall be maintained in good working order.

(6) A person may not have for sale, sell, offer for sale, install, cover, or treat a windshield or window in violation of this
section.

(7) Notwithstanding this section, any person subject to the federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, including motor vehicle
manufacturers, distributors, dealers, importers, and repair businesses, shall comply with the federal standards on motor
vehicle window tinting.

Credits
Laws 2005, c. 2, § 209, eff. Feb. 2, 2005; Laws 2005, c. 26, § 5, eff. May 2, 2005.

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Laws 2005, c. 26 added "including rear side windows located behind the vehicle operator" in subsec. (2)(c).
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